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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of JAMES l 
JOHN LATSIS (also sometimes known C N 7954 
as "LATSES"), ase o. 
Deceased 
APPELLANT'S' BRIEF 
This appeal is taken from orders entered December 
12, 1952, dismissing the petition of the heirs of James 
John Latsis, deceased, residing in Greece. That petition 
alleged improper acts of the administrators in making 
other than the proper intestate distribution without ap-
propriate notice to those non-residents, and that the dis-
tributions made were contrary to the prior order of the 
probate court which provided for distribution upon 
agreement by the heirs in Greece, which agreement was 
never had or obtained. That petition further prayed 
that distribution should be ordered according to the laws 
of succession. 
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STATE~1ENT OF FACTS 
Dilnitrious John Latsis, also known as J mnes John 
Latsis, died intestate at Salt Lake City, Utah on Febru-
ary 5, 1944 and left surviving him as his heirs Virginia 
Latsis, his widow, Vassilios John Latsis, sometin1es 
known as vVilliam J. Latsis, brother, Nickolaoas Latsis, 
sometimes known as Nick J. Latsis, brother, John G. 
Latsis, sometimes knovvn as Constantinos John Latsis, 
only son of Gust J. Latsis, deceased brother, and Peter 
J. Latsis, brother (Tr. 4, 158-159). At the time of the 
death of said decedent all of said heirs, with the excep-
tion of Virginia Latsis and Peter J. Latsis, resided at 
Asterion, Laconia, in the Province of Parmon, Sparta, in 
Greece (Tr. 184). The estate consisted of assets ap-
praised by the Inheritance Tax appraisers at $89,499.11, 
of which $56,259.00 was real property (Tr. 76-82). 
On :March 14, 1944 Letters of Administration were 
issued to Utah Savings & Trust Company and Virginia 
Latsis (Tr. 8) and they qualified as such administra-
tors and ever since have been and now are the duly quali-
fied and acting administrators of said estate; on I\Iarrh 
8, 1944 the Honorable A. H. Ellett, one of the judges of 
the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, upon his own mo-
tion, appointed N. J. Cotro-Manes, an attorney at law 
duly authorized to practice in the State of Utah to act 
' as attorney for the non-resident heirs of said estate (Tr. 
240-241). 
On December 12, 19-t-4 the administrators of said 
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estate entered into a stipulation with Peter J. Latsis and 
N. J. Cotro-Manes representing the non-resident heirs, 
whereby it was stipulated and agreed that the said four 
heirs other than Yirginia Latsis would receive as their 
full distributive portion of said estate the sun1 of $10,-
000.00; that said stipulation further provided "That the 
said payment and settlement shall be binding and con-
clusive as to each of the said four heirs, particularly 
John Latsis, \Villiam J. Latsis, Nick J. Latsis and John 
G. Latsis, upon the acceptance of his portion of said fund 
and the execution of the necessary instruments to receipt 
therefor and to assign his said interest and release the 
said estate. That the said settlement shall become bind-
ing as to each of the said heirs accepting the same and 
executing such instruments." (Tr. 86-88). On February 
27, 1945 the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., one of the 
judges of the District Court of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, after a 
hearing, entered an order approving the stipulation for 
settlement with the heirs, which order provided, among 
other things, "It is further ORDERED that the said 
agreement and distribution shall become binding and 
conclusive as to each of the said four heirs upon the 
acceptance by him, or by his heirs at law, of said pay-
ments." (Tr. 95-97) ; that the only heir that accepted the 
payment provided by said stipulation was Peter J. Lats1s, 
who accepted the sum of money and executed the release 
and assignment required (Tr. 123-124). 
On August 22, 1945 the adn1inistrators of saicl t~sta~-c 
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filed their petition for approval of their final ac•~ount 
and for a decree of distribution, and in said petitwn the 
following allegations were made: 
"5. In the course of probate, a petition was 
presented for and on behalf of the heirs of the said 
decedent other than Virginia Latsis, his wife. 
This petition set forth the desirability of making 
a settlement with, and distribution to, the other 
said heirs prior to the final distribution hereof. 
In said petition filed in the. above proceeding on 
February 13, 1945, the said heirs set forth their 
reasons for desiring a settlement of all their 
claims and interest against the said estate for the 
sum of $10,000.00 and for an earlier distribution 
to them based on the estimated value of their 
interest herein. This petition was consented to by 
Virginia Latsis and by your petitioners. 
"On F'ebruary 21, 1945, a hearing was had in 
which the attorney for said heirs other than Yir-
ginia Latsis, presented evidence in support of the 
said petition, whereupon the same was allowed, 
and on F'ebruary 27, 1945, an order of this court 
was duly made and filed herein approving the 
said petition and fixing the attorney's fees of 
the attorney for the heirs and directing the ad-
ministrators of this estate to pay and distribute 
to the said heirs and their attorney the said 
amount of $10,000.00 in the manner set forth in 
said order. It was also ordered that the balance 
of the said estate be distributed to Virginia Latsis, 
the surviving wife of the said decedent. 
"6. Pursuant to the above-mentioned order, 
the petitioners have paid and distributed $4,750 
of said $10,000.00 as follows: To Peter J. Latsis, 
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in full settlement - $2000.00; to John G. Latsis, 
Nick J. Latsis and William J. Latsis - $500.00 
each, through the A1nerican Express Company; 
and to N. J. Cotro-:11anes, to apply on his attor-
ney's fees as fixed by the Court- $1250.00. That 
there remains to be paid on said settlement the 
sun1 of $5,250.00 as follows: The amount of 
$1500.00 each to the said three heirs, John G. 
Latsis, Nick J. Latsis and vVilliam J. Latsis, and a 
balance of $750.00 to Attorney N. J. Cotro-Manes. 
That there is no cash in the hands of petitioners 
from the estate to complete the said distribution, 
or to pay the administrators fees, attorneys fees 
and the cost of closing the estate. That Virginia 
Latsis, the sole remaining distributee of the said 
estate has deposited with the Utah Savings & 
Trust Company the said sum of $5,250.00 for dis-
tribution to said heirs and their attorney, and 
has agreed to deposit and provide the additional 
sums necessary to pay the remaining fees and 
costs herein. That she prefers to provide the 
necessary cash rather than have the petitioners 
sell any of the property of the estate." (Tr. 106-
121). 
On October 9, 1945 the court entered its order approving 
the final account and made its decree of distribution and 
stated tl1erein as part of its findings the following: 
"4. The account of the petitioners as pre-
sen ted showed all receipts and all dis burs em en ts, 
vouchers having been presented herewith covering 
all disbursements, and it appeared that all such 
have been regularly made and properly author-
ized. It further appears from the records and 
files herein that under an order dated February 
27, 1945 by Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., Judge 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
of the above-entitled Court, a settlement with 
all of the heirs of said deceased, other than Vir-
ginia Latsis, was made and approved, by which 
the said four heirs were to receive $10,000.00 as 
their full share and in settlement of the claims of 
each and all of said heirs against this said estate. 
That in said proceeding it was ordered that Attor-
ney N. J. Cotro-Manes, theretofore e1nployed, and 
appointed by the Court, to represent said heirs, 
was to receive out of said sum of $10,000.00 as his 
attorney's fees the sum of $2000.00, a portion to 
be paid forthwith, and the balance upon the final 
distribution to the said heirs, he to render the 
additional services required in arranging and 
insuring the receipt by the said heirs of the 
amount which each is entitled to receive under 
said settlement. That such distribution was to be 
made to said heirs through the American Ex-
press Company or the Hellenic Bank Trust Com-
pany. 
"5. That full settlement and payment has 
been made to Peter J. Latsis, residing in Utah, 
and his receipt, release and discharge filed herein. 
That $1500 has been forwarded through the 
American Express Company, being $500.00 each, 
to each of the said three remaining collateral 
heirs. That $1250.00 has been paid toN. J. Cotro-
~fanes, as attorney for the said heirs. That there 
remains to be paid and disbursed the sum of $5,-
250.00, as follows: $1500.00, each, to John G. Lat-
sis, Nick J. Latsis and William J. Latsis, and a 
balance of $750.00 to Attorney N .. J. Cotro-Manes 
when the prior distribution of said prior respec-
tive sums to each of said three heirs is completed. 
"6. That there was, and is, insufficient cash 
in the hands of the administrators of said estate 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
to make such payments and such distributions and 
the expenses of closing the estate. That there has 
been filed herein a statement and an agreement 
on the part of Yirginia Latsis, the surviving wife 
of the said deceased and the heir entitled to all the 
remaining estate, in which she has agreed to pay 
the necessary cash to take care of said charges 
and expenses and to deposit with Utah Savings 
& Trust Company the sum of $5,250.00, to be 
transmitted as aforesaid. The said Utah Savings 
& Trust Company has received and has filed here-
in its acknowledgment of the receipt of $5,250.00 
to be transmitted to the said remaining heirs and 
paid to their attorney, in the manner heretofore 
ordered herein, and in the an1ounts aforesaid. 
"It, also, appears that the administrators 
herein have rendered special services, and that 
the Utah Savings & Trust Company, as adminis-
trator, is entitled to an additional and extra al-
lowance of $750.00. 
"Receipts showing the payment, as afore-
said, by Virginia Latsis of the attorneys fees, 
administrators fees and costs of closing the said 
estate have been filed herein, and the estate is now 
in condition .to be closed, and the administrators 
discharged." (Tr. 126-128). 
Then in the order of October 9, 1945 the court stated the 
following: 
"The settlement, payments and distribution, 
and provision for distribution, made pursuant to 
the order herein of February 27, 1945, and as 
hereinabove set forth, is approved and allowed. 
"It is further ordered that all of the remain-
~ng properties of the said estate, after the pay-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
n1ents and distributions aforesaid, of every na-
ture, real or personal, whether discovered or un-
discovered, and all property interests of the de-
cedent at the time of his death, or acquired by his 
estate, are hereby distributed to Virginia Latsis, 
the surviving wife of the said decedent." (Tr. 
128). 
No notice was posted or 1nailed of the hearing of the 
petition for approval of the stipulation, and upon which 
hearing the order of February 27, 1945 was entered. 
That order of February 27th specifically states "all the 
parties having joined in said petition and being repre-
sented, no notice was required or ordered on said peti-
tion." (Tr. 95). 
The notice given in relation to the hearing of the 
petition on the final account and for distribution pro-
vided as follows: 
"The petition of Utah Savings & Trust Co., et 
al. administrators of the estate of James John 
Latsis, etc. deceased, praying for the settlement 
of final account of said administrators and for 
the distribution of the residue of the estate, to the 
persons entitled, and discharge has been set for 
hearing on Wednesday, the 5th day of Septem-
ber, A. D. 1945, at ten o'clock A.M. at the County 
Court House, in the Court Room of said Court, 
in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah." (Tr. 
105). 
In accordance with the proof of mailing, a copy of the 
above notice was forwarded to each of the heirs residing 
in Greece. 
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The settlement pay1nents and distribution have never 
been 1nade in accordance with the provisions of the order 
of February 27, 1945. In fact, the three payments o,f 
$500.00 each which were to be forwarded to the heirs 
in Greece were returned by the American Express Cmn-
pany after deducting certain costs. The letter from the 
American Express Cmnpany, dated December 31, 1945 
(Tr.137), states: 
"Our correspondents advise that they are un-
able to deliver the above remittances. 
"We are, therefore, authorized to refund to 
you the sum of $1,490.86 upon surrender of your 
receipt. Please call at our office at your con-
venience, and we will be pleased to make refund to 
you." (Tr. 137). 
Mr. Cotro-Manes alleges the same facts in his petition 
for the order authorizing the administrators to pay fees 
filed in the court on or about the 9th day of January, 
1946, wherein he states : 
"8. That your petitioner has been advised 
by the American Express Company that their cor-
respondents at Athens, Greece, was not able to 
deliver the above remittances and therefore they 
have paid to the administrator as refund $1,490.-
86, $9.14 having been expended for cables." (Tr. 
135). 
On October 29, 1951 petitioners and appellants here-
in, being one heir and the representatives of two deceased 
heirs in Greece, filed a petition directing the court's at-
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tention to improper acts of the adininistrators and for an 
order to show cause why the administrators should not 
be required to properly administer the estate (Tr. 158-
172); on October 26, 1951 the court issued its order which, 
among other things, required the administrators to show 
cause why distribution sho~d not be made in accordance 
with the order of February 27, 1945, or why the heirs 
should not receive their respective portions of the estate 
(Tr. 155-156). On August 1, 1952 Vassilios John Latsis, 
sometimes known as Willimn John Latsis, one of the peti-
tioners and appellants, filed a petition directing the 
court's attention to improper acts of the administrators 
and for an order to show cause why the administrators 
should not be required to properly administer the estate 
(Tr. 183-197). An order to show cause was issued on 
August 1, 1952 (Tr. 180-181), which was duly served on 
August 2, 1952. On November 20, 1951 the Utah Savings 
& Trust Company, one of the administrators, filed its 
motion to dismiss (Tr. 153-154), and on August 11, 1952 
Virginia Latsis Zambukos, the co-administrator, filed a 
motion to dismiss (Tr. 198-199), both of said motions 
being identical and under part I thereof providing: 
"TO DISMISS 
1. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
2. Lack of jurisdiction over the person. 
3. Insufficiency of process. 
4. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. 
5. Failure to join an indispensable party." (Tr. 
198). 
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On N oven1ber 25, 1D5~, after the n1otions to dismiss had 
been argued, an order granting the 1notions to dismiss 
each of said petitions was entered (rrr. 203-204), and 
thereafter on December 12, 1952 the court again entered 
an order dis1nissing each of said petitions ( Tr. 205-208), 
that later order providing in part: 
"This dismissal is upon the grounds of Sub-
&ivision I, the 'Motion to Dismiss' of Utah Sav-
ings and Trust Company, and it is not necessary, 
therefore, to consider the Sub-division II, its ':M.:o-
tion to Strike', nor Subdivision III designated as 
'Requirement of Authority', and these two sub-
divisions have not been passed upon or decided. 
"This order, effective this date, takes the 
place of the Order of Dismissal herein dated No-
vember 25, 1952, and which latter order has been 
and is hereby vacated and set aside." (Tr. 206). 
A similar provision is contained in the order dismissing 
the petition in relation to Virginia Latsis Zambukos. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
CLAIMS OF PETITIONERS HAVE NOT BEEN SET-
TLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PETITION AND 
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT AND ORDER OF FEBRU-
ARY 27, 1945. 
POINT 2 . 
. DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION HAS NOT BEEN CARRIED 
OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS TERMS. 
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POINT 3. 
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT HAVING FAILED, 
THE ESTATE SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH THE LAWS OF SUCCESSION. 
POINT 4. 
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE DISTRIBU-
TION MADE TO THEM OF THEIR DISTRIBUTIVE SHARES 
OF THE ASSETS OF SAID ESTATE IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE LAWS OF SUCCESSION. 
POINT 5. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS ORDERS OF 
DECEMBER 12, 1952, DISMISSING THE PETITIONS DATED 
OCTOBER 26, 1951 AND AUGUST 1, 1952, RESPECTIVELY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
CLAIMS OF PETITIONERS HAVE NOT BEEN SET-
TLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PETITION AND 
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT AND ORDER OF FEBRU-
ARY 27, 1945. 
For the purpose of discussing the question of 
whether the petitioners have been paid in accordance 
with the stipulation entered into by N. J. Cotro-Manes 
on their behalf, we will assume that Mr. Cotro-l\fanes 
had the authority to enter into such a Htipulation and 
bind the heirs and that the court had jurisdiction and 
authority to make its order of February '27, 1945. Vve 
make this statement for the reason that there is serious 
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question in our minds as to whether Mr. Cotro-Manes, 
in the first place, could enter into such a stipulation 
where no notice was given to the heirs in question of the 
hearing concerning the appointment of an attorney to 
represent then1, and where there is no showing that after 
his appointment by the court he ·was ever in communica-
tion with the parties or advised them of the nature of the 
stipulation he was going to enter into, and where, in the 
record, it further appears that no notice of the hearing 
of the petition to approve the stipulation was either 
posted or mailed or otherwise given to the heirs in 
Greece. 
But assuming, as above indicated, that the stipula-
tion is binding and the order valid, it is apparent from 
the record that the term.s and conditions of the stipula-
tion and order. have never been fulfilled. The stipulation 
and petition provides : 
"That the said payment and settlement shall 
become binding and conclusive as to _each of the 
said four heirs, Peter J. Latsis, William J. Latsis, 
Nick J. Latsis and John G. Latsis, upon the ac-
ceptance of his portion of said fund and the ex-
ecution of the necessary instruments to receipt 
therefor and to assign his said interest and re-
lease the said estate. That the said settlement 
shall become binding as to each of said heirs ac-
cepting the same and executing such instruments." 
(Tr. 87). 
The order, in like language, states : 
"It is further ORDERED that the said agree-
ment and distribution shall become binding and 
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conclusive as to each of the said four heirs upon 
the acceptance by him, or by his heirs at law, of 
said payments. 
"It is further ORDERED that the said heirs 
shall furnish, or that their attorney shall procure 
from the said recipients of said payments, a 
proper receipt therefor and an assignment and 
relinquishment of all interest in this said estate, 
and a release of the administrators herein, which 
receipt and relinquishment shall be delivered to 
the administrators. 
"It is further ORDERED that upon the dis-
bursement as herein provided to the said four 
heirs hereinabove nmned, the balance of the said 
estate of the said deceased, after the paYJ.nent of 
all taxes, debts and other obligations, shall belong 
to and shall be distributed to Virginia Latsis." 
(Tr. 97). 
There can be, and we believe there is, no dispute as to the 
fact that three of said heirs, namely: William J. Latsis, 
Nick J. Latsis and John G. Latsis, have never received 
any sum of money whatsoever from the administrators 
of said estate, nor have they ever signed any receipts 
or releases as provided by the petition and stipulation 
and the order. In fact, the record clearly indicates that 
some of the money, if not all, is being held by the lT tah 
Savings & Trust Company to date. 
The question then arises whether a subsequent order 
of the court, and namely, the order and decree settling 
the final account and ordering distribution, dated Oc-
tober 9, 1945, has modified the stipulation and the order 
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of February 27, 1945. Appellants contend that it has not 
been Inodified and that, under the proceedings had, the 
court had no jurisdiction to modify said order. It is true 
that the order of October 9, 19-15 states "The settlement, 
payments and distribution, and provisions for distribu-
tion, 1nade pursuant to the order herein of February 27, 
1945, and as hereinabove set forth, is approved and 
allowed." (Tr. 128). However, under the order of Febru-
ary 27, 1945 there was no provision made for the pay-
ment of this money to the Utah Savings & Trust C-?n1-
pany, and that order could not be modified by a subse-
quent order unless proper notice of the hearing for modi-
fication was given. 
Bancroft's Probate Practice, Second Edition, Vol-
ume 1, Section 82, Page 191: 
"A finding in a probate decree that due and 
legal notice has been given is conclusive that the 
court obtained jurisdiction of the proceeding, but 
not that it extended to matters beyond those dis-
closed by the notice forming part of the record." 
The notice posted and published covering the hear-
ing of the petition for settlement of the final account and 
for distribution contained no statement therein that the 
order of February 27, 1945, or the stipulation covered 
thereby, was to be modified, altered or changed in any 
particular. The notice given was that "The petition of 
Utah Savings & Trust Co., et al. administrators of the 
estate of James John Latsis, etc. deceased, praying for 
the settlement of final account of said administrators 
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and for the distribution of the residue of the estate, to 
the persons entitled, & discharge has been set for hear-
ing* * *.'' (Tr. 105). If the heirs in Greece had received 
knowledge of the terms of the stipulation and the order 
of February 27, 1945, they knew they had not accepted 
the same and, by ·the notice above given, they had no 
knowledge that it was to be altered and changed and 
that they were going to be required to accept the settle-
ment regardless of their desires, and they would merely 
be advised that they would receive the portion of the 
estate that they would be entitled to regardless of any 
clai1ned settlement. For the order of October 9, 1945 to 
have been binding, notice must have been given; other-
wise, it is invalid as to those portions that were not set 
forth in the notice. 
In Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 Pac. 52:2, 
in a decision written by Justice Frick and concurred in 
by Justice McCarty, the Utah court held that inasmuch 
as probate proceedings are matters in rem no decree of 
distribution should be void for want of notice where the 
administrator was appointed by a court of competent 
jurisdiction on statutory notice. To this opinion, Chief 
Justice Straup vigorously dissented, pointing out the . 
need for proper notice throughout the probate proceed-
ings to protect the rights of the heirs, and in his dissent-
ing opinion Chief Justice Straup pointed out the con-
flict in rationale of the majority opinion in protecting 
real estate titles from subsequent attacks based on de-
fects in the probate procedure as opposed to the rights 
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of heirs to notice of proceedings during probate which 
would affect the rights and title of the heirs. 
Barrette v. Whitney has. not been followed by any 
other jurisdiction and appears to be contrary to the great 
weight of authority, which is uniformly to the effect that 
proper notice upon distribution is jurisdictional. Ban-
croft's Probate Practice, Second Edition, Volume 4, Sec-
tion 1135, Page 418; 21 Am. Jur. 650; 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
368. The courts that have considered the matter of neces-
sity of notice on the decree of distribution have, with 
the exception of the Utah court, uniformly held that the 
decree, in the absence of proper notice, is made without 
jurisdiction and, therefore, may be collaterally attacked. 
Hoppin v. Lang, 241 Pac. 636 (Mont.); Harrison v. 
Cannon, 203 Pac. 2d 978 (Mont.) ; State v. Allen, 294 
Pac. 681 (\Vyo.); Gassin v. McJunkin, 48 Pac. 2d 320 
(Okl.); In re Estate of Parsell, 213 Pac. 40, 25 A.L.R. 
1561 (Cal.) ; Carter v. Frahm, 141 N.W. 370 (S.D.) ; . 
In re Hoscheid's Estate, 139 Pac. 61 (Wash.). 
Section 75-12-6, Utah Code A1'1JYt.otated 1953, speci-
fically provides that the petition for final distribution 
shall contain the names and addresses of the heirs, 
devisees or other persons entitled to participate in dis-
tribution and that upon the clerk's fixing the date of 
hearing notice shall be given. We believe that to give this 
provision for notice on the petition for final distribution 
any meaning, such notice must be mandatory and it must 
be such notice as will give the heirs a fair understanding 
of the contents of the petition, the distribution prayed 
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for, whether it be partial or final, and of other relief 
sought. 
In Child v. District Court of Second Judicial Dis-
trict, 80 ·utah 243, 14 Pac. 2d 1110, our court considered 
the question as to whether heirship may be determined 
before final distribution, and in considering the rights 
of heirs to notice of such a determination the court 
stated: 
"It may be observed in passing that the com-
plaint nowhere alleges that no action is pending 
or to be taken in the administration of the estate 
which 1nay adversely affect the heir's interest. 
But, considered from this angle, it becomes 
immediately apparent that the heir may be denied 
from the beginning substantial rights. His right 
to notice of all proceedings is important; sales 
of property, mortgages, and family allowance, all 
affect his rights, and if he is in fact an heir, he 
should be afforded an opportunity to be heard in 
respect thereto." 
The court further stated: 
"If the district court has jurisdiction to pro-
bate the estate, it should and must have the right 
to fully protect the interests of all the heirs." 
We respectfully submit that this court should re-
consider its holding in Barrette v. Whitney and should 
now give meaning to the sections of our probate code re-
quiring notice, and that the requirement of notice should 
be mandatory and jurisdictional. Our contention is that 
to assure due process notice of distribution should be 
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giYen to all of the heirs, and further that this notice 
should have been of the type of distribution actually 
prayed for, that is, a distribution in accordance with the 
stipulation, which distribution would have materially 
altered the share which the heirs could expect on an 
intestate distribution and which latter they would na-
turally expect from a notice of a full and final distribu-
tion. Any notice disclosing any less information would 
make the probate proceedings the instrument for per-
petrating, by a series of in and of themselves legal acts, 
a final vicious wrong in depriving the heirs in Greece 
of their rightful inheritances. 
POINT 2. 
DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION HAS NOT BEEN CARRIED 
OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS TERMS. 
We contend that the order of October 9, 1945 has 
not been complied with, and that it cannot be complied 
with because of the fact that the order, in its directions, 
incorporates the prior order of February 27, 1945, which 
prior order is conditional and the conditions therein set 
forth have never been accomplished. The order of Febru-
ary 27, 1945 is incorporated into the order of October 
9, 1945 by the following language of the second order:· 
"It further appears from the records and files 
herein that an order dated February 27, 1945, 
by the Honorable Ray Van Cott, J r;, Judge of 
the above entitled court, and settlement with all 
of the heirs of the said deceased, other than Vir-
ginia Latsis, was made and approved by which 
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the said four heirs were to receive $10,000.00 as 
their full share and in settlement of the claims of 
each and all of the said heirs against this said es-
tate. That in said proceeding it was ordered that 
Attorney N.J. Cotro Manes theretofore employed, 
and appointed by the Court, to represent said 
heirs, was to receive out of said sum of $10,000.00 
as his attorney's fees the sum of $2000.00, a por-
tion to be paid forthwith and the balance upon 
the final distribution to the said heirs, he to ren-
der the additional services required in arranging 
and insuring the receipt by the said heirs of the 
.amount which each is entitled to receive under 
said settlement." (Tr. 126-127). 
The incorporation by reference of the first order into 
the final order of October 9, 1945 appears even more 
clearly from the following portion of the final order: 
"The settlement, payments and distribution 
and provision for distribution made pursuant to 
the order herein of F'ebruary 27, 1945, and as 
hereinabove set forth, is approved and allowed." 
(Tr. 128). 
Horton v. Winbigler, 165 Pac. 423 (Cal.), involved 
a situation of an incorporation into a final decree of 
distribution of a prior agreement between the son and 
the grandmother of the decedent, whereby the grand-
mother was to "take under the will one half of the moneys 
of the estate to use and enjoy during her life." The Cali-
fornia court held that since the agreement was referred 
to in the decree of distribution it became a part of the 
decree, and the following language was used: 
"In making a decree of distribution a court 
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1nay incorporate the provisions of the will therein 
or a contract or agreement entered into between 
the heirs and which is called to the attention of the 
court with a view of having it incorporated in 
the decree; and the court may, by express terms 
or by apt reference there~o, incorporate said will 
or contract in the decree so as to constitute it a 
portion of its distributive terms. This is what 
was done in the decree of distribution under con-
sideration. The court incorporated the will and 
the contract between plaintiff and Mrs. Brown as 
to the respective interests which each should take 
on distribution, and pursuant thereto made dis-
tribution accordingly. When a necessity arose 
thereafter to construe said decree, the court was 
not limited to a consideration of the particular 
.provision of it, as claimed by appellant, but it was 
the duty of the court to look to the will and the 
contract which were made a part of the decree, 
together with the other terms, in order to ascer-
tain just what the terms of the distribution were, 
because the distribution as declared by the court 
was in accordance with the provisions of the will 
and the agreement of the heirs. This declaration 
and reference to the will and agreement made 
them a part of the decree as effectually as though 
set forth in it. The court was not, as appellant 
asserts, allowing the admission of the will and 
contract as matters extraneous to the terms of 
the decree for the purpose of modifying or chang-
ing the decree of distribution. The court was ad-
mitting these instruments, which were in effect 
part of the decree of distribution because referred 
to therein and declared to be the basis of the de-
cree itself, not to modify it or change it in any 
particular, but for the purpose of construing it in 
its entirety and determining just what was meant 
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by all its distributive provisions. The right of the 
court to incorporate provisions of a will o:r agree-
ment by express reference in a decree of distri-
bution and thereafter in an action involving a 
consideration of the decree to resort to said will 
and agreement as part of the decree in construing 
its tern1s, as was done in this case, is well settled 
in this state. Goldtree v. Thon1pson, 79 Cal. 613, 
22 Pac. 50; Goad v. Montgomery, 119 Cal. 552, 
51 Pac. 681, 63 Am. St. Rep. 145; McCloud v. 
Hewlett, 135 Cal. 361, 67 Pac. 333." 
The Utah case of In re Efferson's Estate, 70 Utah 
258, 259 Pac. 919, adopts the same rule that a will may 
be incorporated into and become a part of the decree and 
that the will may be resorted to for the purpose of inter-
preting the decree. 
"The propriety of resorting to the will to 
explain and interpret the decree in the respects 
mentioned cannot be doubted and when the will 
is considered in connection with the decree there 
is no uncertainty." 
While the case of In re Ewer's Will, 170 Cal. 660, 171 
Pac. 683, adopts the same rule as the Efferson case just 
cited, we refer to the language in that case because it 
is particularly appropriate to this case. In the instant 
case a single phrase of the order states absolutely that 
distribution of the residue is to be made to Virginia Lat-
sis. If that single portion of the order alone were to be 
considered, then there is no doubt that the distribution 
of the residue is to be made to Yirginia Latsi:.;, but when 
that portion of the order is considered together with the 
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context of the entire order, which has incorporated in 
it a separate order, then the real meaning of the order 
is obtained, and that real meaning is that distribution 
of the residue is not to be made unless the releases are 
obtained from the heirs and unless the heirs conveyed 
their interests to the other heir, Virginia Latsis. The fol-
lowing is quoted fron1 In re Ewer's Will, supra: 
'' vVhile a single phrase of the decree, apart 
frmn the context, though indefinite in itself, could 
possibly be considered as a distribution of the 
fund absolutely to Eliza B. Ewer, yet the decree 
as a whole shows that the intention of the court 
making it was to give the fund over to the trustee 
to hold and dispose of it upon the trust stated in 
the will, and in accordance therewith. It should, 
therefore, be given that effect." 
The order of distribution thus incorporates within 
itself the order of February 27, 1945. That order in turn 
incorporates within itself the petition and stipulation 
filed February 13, 1945. vVe reach this latter conclusion 
because the order of February 27, 1945 contains a refer-
ence to the petition and stipulation. The reference is 
clear and concise and is in this language : 
"It is further ORDERED that the said agree-
ment and distribution shall become binding and 
conclusive as to each of the said four heirs upon 
the acceptance by him, or by his heirs at law, of 
said payments." (Tr. 97). 
It is by this apt reference to the agreement and to the 
distribution that the petition and stipulation becomes 
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incorporated into and a part of the order of February 
27, 1945. 
There are at least two other references in the order 
of F'ebruary 27, 1945 by which the petition and stipula-
tion is incorporated into the order of February 27, 1945. 
N orinally, it is unnecessary for an order to recite the 
facts upon which it is based because Section 75-14-15, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, does not require that the 
facts be set out upon which the court has based its order, 
but in the instant case there is ~recital in the order which 
reads as follows : 
"The Court finds the facts as recited in the 
petition to be correct,***." (Tr. 95). 
In order to determine what those facts are, it is neces-
sary to refer to the petition and stipulation and, there-
fore, this reference is sufficient to cause the petition and 
stipulation to be incorporated into and become a part 
of the order of February 27, 1945. The petition and 
stipulation can be used to explain and to interpret the 
order of February 27, 1945. In our view it is not neces-
sary to resort to the petition and stipulation in order 
to learn the full meaning of the order of February 27, 
1945. The order itself is specific and clear. 
The net result is that the order of distribution has 
incorporated within it both the order of February ~7, 
1945 and the petition and stipulation filed February 13, 
1945. The direction to the administrator:.; with reference 
to distribution is contained in the order of distribution, 
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a part of which are both the order of February 27, 1945 
and the petition and stipulation of February 13, 1945 .. 
Reading these documents together and giving effect to 
their meaning, the direction to the administrators is that 
distribution shall be made of all of the property (other' 
than the $10,000.00) to V~rginia Latsis, only if the settle-
ment "shall become binding and conclusive as to each 
of the said four heirs * * *". -Similarly, the order of 
February 27, 1945, becoming as it does a part of the final 
order of distribution, decrees: "That upon the disburse-
ment as herein provided to the said four heirs herein-
above named, the balance of the said estate of the said 
deceased * * * shall belong to and be distributed to 
Virginia Latsis" (Tr. 97). "Disbursement as herein 
provided" meant when the disbursement would be ac-
cepted by each of the heirs there would also be required 
"the execution of the necessary instruments to receipt 
therefor and to assign his said interest and release the 
said estate" (Tr. 87). In other words, disbursement as 
provided in the order would not be complete until the 
heirs did four things: 
( 1) Accepted the amount tendered 
(2) Executed the necessary instruments to receipt 
therefor 
(3) Assigned his said interest and conveyed his title 
( 4) Released the said estate. 
Since not one of these four things was done, it cannot be 
contended that there has been "disbursement as herein 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
provided to the s-aid four heirs", and since that has not 
occurred, the balance of the said estate of the said de-
ceased was not ordered to be distributed to Virginia 
Latsis since the distribution never became binding and 
since the order provided that "the balance of the said 
estate of the said deceased * * * shall belong to and be 
distributed to Virginia Latsis upon the disbursement as 
herein provided to the said four heirs" Virginia Latsis 
never became entitled to the balance of the said estate. 
This is further made clear by the terms of the order : 
"It is further ordered that all of the remain-
ing properties of the said estate, after the pay-
ments and distributions aforesaid, * * * are here-
by distributed to Virginia Latsis, the surviving 
wife of the said decedent." (Tr. 128). 
The proposed distribution to the four heirs never 
was made; the distribution never became binding and, 
therefore, the administrators should not have distributed 
the real properties and residue to Virginia Latsis. 
POINT 3. 
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT HAVING FAILED, 
THE ESTATE SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH THE LAWS OF SUCCESSION. 
It is our contention that inasmuch as the conditions 
imposed on the order of February 27, 1945 were never 
c01npleted, and as that order was subsequently incor-
porated in the order of October 9, 1945, that subsequent 
order was in fact a nullity as far as any distribution waH 
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concerned and until a distribution in accordance with 
the laws of succession is made this estate is still open 
and the fiduciaries continue to be responsible until a 
c01nplete and final distribution is made. 
The intestate distribution to which the petitioners 
were entitled would by our calculations amount to 
$4,916.20 each, in comparison to the cash sum stipulated 
to be distributed to each heir in Greece, namely, $2,000.00 
after attorney's fees (Tr. 96). By the Inheritance Tax 
Inventory and Appraisement (Tr. 99) the total property 
was appraised at $79,829.11. Rents of $9,771.32 were 
collected during probate and until June 26, 1945 (Tr. 
116). This total in the hands of the administrators, 
less the widow's dower interest of $18,753.00 and debts 
and expenses of administration of $12,350.24 ( Tr. 99-
101), leaves $58,497.19. Of this amount the widow is by 
statute entitled to $25,000.00 and one-half of the re-
mainder, leaving $16,748.60 for distribution among the 
brothers of decedent and their representatives. Peter 
J. Latsis accepted $2,000.00 by his stipulation, leaving 
$14,748.60 for a three-way division of $4,916.20 for each 
of the brothers in Greece. This computation is based on 
values as of the date of death of decedent. The real 
properties of the estate have greatly appreciated in value 
since 1944, and any computation of dollar value on 
intestate distribution should be made as of the time 
for distribution and should include therein rents and 
profits collected and accrued to that time. 
Mr. Cotro-Manes was appointed by the court to rep-
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resent certain named heirs, including Nick J. Latsis, a 
brother of the decedent (Tr. 241). Before .the provisions 
of the stipulation were carried out as to Nick J. Latsis, 
as one of the heirs, said Nick J. Latsis died, leaving as 
his heirs two minor children, John Nikolaou Latsis and 
Panagiotou (Panayiotis) Nikolaou Latsis, who are now 
and have been at all times material herein residents of 
Greece (Tr. 213). Mr. Cotro-Manes was not appointed 
to represent these minors or the heirs or estate of Nick 
J. Latsis and he could thus in no way stipulate on behalf 
of these minors in regard any settlement agreement. 
If, by any means, Mr. Cotro-Manes can be said to have 
represented the estate of Nick J. Latsis or John G. 
Latsis, who was the minor child of Gust J. Latsis (Tr. 
241), any such representation and the stipulation entered 
into by Mr. Cotro-Manes were effective only until notice 
could be given to all of the heirs in Greece and until 
those heirs had an opportunity to affirm the stipulation, 
or until the minor heir, John G. Latsis, and the estate 
of Nick J. Latsis could disaffirm the stipulation. The dis-
affirmance of those parties was made in the form of their 
petition to the probate court in this matter, which peti-
tion was made as soon as actual notice of the acts of the 
administrators was received by the heirs in Greece. 
Smith v. Williams, 139 S.E. 625, 54 A.L.R. 964 
(S.C.), involved a situation where a property. settlement 
was made on behalf of three minor heirs. The court 
there stated that family settlements are favorites of the 
law, but that "in an agreement of this character, infancy 
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makes it voidable, not void. If disaffirmance is intended, 
then the acts of disaffirmance must be made within a 
reasonable time after the disability of infancy ceases." 
In Lupton v. Bangs, 242 Pac. 830, 54 A.L.R. 979 · 
(Ore.), in a suit to enforce a family settlement, the court 
held: 
"While equity is anxious to encourage and 
enforce family settlements in order to preserve 
the peace and harmony of families, the parties 
are required to deal with the utmost good faith 
towards each other, and equity will readily seize 
upon any fraud or unconscionable practice to 
induce the settlement, to set it aside, in applica-
tion of the well-established rule that, where there 
is a confidential relation between relatives in 
respect to an inheritance or distributive sha,res 
of an estate, equity will readily relieve a party 
who has yielded to the coercive influence of 
another." 
Utah law would appear to be clear that the admin-
istrator cannot be discharged until the estate has been 
fully administered and a complete and final distribution 
made to the heirs. In In re Barker's Guardianship, 103 
Utah 109, 133 Pac. 2d 784, an order was entered that 
the guardian "is discharged as guardian herein and his 
bondsmen are hereby discharged and exonerated." The 
court subsequently entertained a petition for an order 
to show cause filed by the ward, an incompetent. In the 
concurring opinion Judge Wolfe, then Chief Justice, 
stated: 
"I concur on the ground that the Probate 
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Court has inherent power to enforce its order 
to pay money owing to its ward; that any dis-
charge is conditional on the guardian so doing. 
The order to show cause was in pursuance of this 
inherent power." 
The san1e rule has been set forth by our court in 
In re Brooks' Estate, 83 Utah 506, 30 Pac. 2d 1065, where-
in the court stated: 
"The ultimate end to be accomplished by a 
probate proceeding is to vest possession, or both 
title and possession, of the property of the estate 
in those entitled thereto. The duties of an admin-
istrator are not completed until the property of 
the estate has been delivered to the persons to 
whom the probate court directs that it shall be 
delivered whether it be a claim allowed against 
the estate or a decree of distribution. The admin-
istrator has not performed the trust imposed 
upon him by law until and unless he pays the 
claim or delivers the property to the distributee. 
R. S. Utah 1933, 102-9-25, 102-11-20, 102-11-21, 
102-12-19. The duties of an administrator are not 
fully performed until he has not only accounted 
for, but also distributed, as ordered by the court, 
all of the assets of the estate which has come int•> 
his possession as administrator. Ehrngren v. 
Gronlund, 19 Utah 411, 57 P. 268." 1 
In the instant case the order of February 27, 1945 
approved a stipulation for a settlement which was to 
become binding "upon the acceptance of his portion of 
said fund and the execution of the necessary instnnnenb 
to receipt therefor and to assign his said interest and 
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release the said estate. That the said settlement shall 
become binding as to each of said heirs accepting the 
same and executing such instruments." (Tr. 87). It is 
implicit in this order that if the moneys proposed to be 
paid by the settlement are not accepted and if the instru-
ments, namely, the assignment by the heirs of their dis-
tributive share of the estate to the widow, are not re-
ceived, that there then must be a distribution to those 
heirs of their interest in the estate as fixed by law. 
Section 74-4-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The District 
Court has not changed that order but further incor-
porated it in the order of October 9, 1945. We contend 
that the District Court has continued to have the inher-
ent power to determine why this order was not carried 
out and to complete the probate of this estate. There 
has been no distribution effected when the two orders 
of the District Court are examined together and until 
a distribution is made the District Court should retain 
jurisdiction over the property of the estate and no dis-
charge of the administrators could be made. Any such 
discharge is conditional upon the estate having been 
fully administered, including a distribution to the parties 
entitled, with the proper showing of receipt of such 
distribution by them. Section 75-12-19, Utah Code Awno-
tated 1953. 
POINT 4. 
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE DISTRIBU-
TION MADE TO THEM OF THEIR DISTRIBUTIVE SHARES 
OF THE ASSETS OF SAID ESTATE IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE LAWS OF SUCCESSION. 
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The law in Utah is clearly settled that title to real 
property vests in the heirs at the instant of death of 
the decedent, subject to probate. In Chamberlain v. 
Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 Pac. 2d 355, the court clearly 
set forth the following rule: 
"Upon the death of the decedent, the title 
to any property of which she died possessed, 
immediately passed to and vested in her heirs, 
subject to administration and the payment of 
debts. The purpose of an adjudication of heir-
ship is not to vest title, but to adjudicate where 
the title of the decedent has already vested. 
Regardless of whether there had been an adjudi-
cation of heirship, the rights of heirs can be 
asserted or defended in any proper manner." 
The provisions of our probate code clearly contem-
plate that title vested in the heirs and that the admin-
istrator is entitled to take possession of the real property 
only for the purpose of completion of the probate, 
which includes payment of the debts of the decedent, 
collection of the rents and profits from the real property 
during the interim of the probate and ultimately deter-
mining the rights of the heirs and their respective shares 
in the real property. 
Section 75-12-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, pro-
vides as follows: 
"Partition or distribution of the real estate 
may be made as provided in this chapter, although 
some of the original heirs, legatees or devisees 
may have conveyed their shares to other person:-;, 
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and such shares must be assigned to the persons 
holding the same in the same manner as they 
otherwise would have been to such heirs, legatees 
or devisees." (Italics ours). 
Our statute clearly contemplates a conveyance by an 
instrument ordinarily used for the transfer of title to 
real property. In the case of In re Miles' Estate, 63 
Utah 164, 223 Pac. 337, the sole heir of the estate exe-
cuted an assignment, absolute in fonn, to a bank and 
thereupon petitioned the court to distribute directly 
to the bank. A creditor of the estate objected to the 
proposed distribution upon the grounds that the assign-
ments referred to in the petition were not conveyances 
in fact but were made merely to secure the payment of 
a note. The Utah Supreme Court held that the transfer 
was not a conveyance as contemplated by our statute, 
using the following language: 
"We conclude that the court properly decided 
that the assignment, though absolute in form, 
but in fact intended as a mortgage, was not a 
conveyance as contemplated by the statute entitl-
ing the assignee or mortgagee to have the estate 
distributed to him." 
A clear statement of the rule that distribution of 
real property shall be made only to the heirs, or to a 
grantee holding a duly executed conveyance from the 
heirs executed in the manner required for the convey-
ance of real property, is set forth by the California 
Supreme Court in In re Meyer's Estate, 238 Pac. 2d 597 
(Cal.): 
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"The rule is different as to a succession by 
descent. The estate vests in the heir eo instante 
upon the death of the ancestor; and no act of his 
is required to perfect title. The estate is cast on 
the heir by operation of law without regard to his 
wishes or election. No assent or acceptance is 
necessary. He cannot, by an act, cause the estate 
to remain in the ancestor, for the latter is in-
capable of holding it after his death. He cannot, 
by any renunciation or disclaimer, prevent the 
passage of title to himself. Nor can he, by a 
renunciation or disclaimer, transfer the estate 
to any other person as the heir of the ancestor, 
for the object of a renunciation or disclaimer is 
not to transfer, but to prevent a transfer. He 
can only make a transfer by some instrument 
adapted to the transfer of the property." 
Mr. Cotro-Manes was appointed by the probate 
court to represent the non-resident heirs and he was 
specifically directed to attempt to make contact with 
those heirs and to properly bring them before the court 
(Tr. 127). Mr. Cotro-Manes was not authorized to 
execute on behalf of the non-resident heirs quitclaim. 
deeds or any other instrument which would properly 
convey the interest of those heirs in the real property 
of ~he estate. The stipulation entered into by Mr. Cotro-
Manes, and approved by the probate court, contemplated 
the execution by the heirs of the necessary instruments 
to properly transfer and release their interest in the 
estate. Such an instrument of necessity must have been 
a conveyance of their interest in the real property. Such 
instruments were not and have never been executed by 
the heirs. 
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One of the heirs represented by Mr. Cotro-Manes was 
John G. Latsis, sometimes known as Constantinos John 
Latsi:s, a minor, and he was recognized as such at the 
time of ~Ir. Cotro-J\;fanes' appointment (Tr. 241). It was 
a clear impossibility for this minor by himself, or through 
the mere representation of J\1r. Cotro-Manes as his 
attorney, to quitclaim any interest as an heir in the real 
property of the estate. The necessity for the appoint-
ment of a general guardian for this minor was patent 
and the appointment of such a guardian was one of the 
steps toward distribution under the stipulation which 
was absolutely necessary to the passing of title and to 
the carrying out of the very provisions of the stipulation 
itself. 
We submit that the District Court erred in entering 
its order of October 9, 1945 in not requiring as a pre-
requisite thereto a showing of the receipt of proper 
instruments to pass title as contemplated in the stipula-
tion and in the order of February 27, 1945. We further 
submit that the instant probate is unfinished and uncom-
pleted and that the District Court properly should have 
entertained the petition of the non-resident heirs for 
proper administration of the estate. 
Our probate code requires as the final act of the 
administrator, prior to actual distribution, a determina-
tion of heirship. Section 75-12-7, Utah Code Annota,ted 
1953, requires that after the filing of a petition for final 
distribution "the court must proceed to distribute the 
residue of the estate in the hands of the executor or 
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administrator among the persons who by law are entitled 
thereto." Section 75-12-8 then provides that "In the 
order or decree the court must name the persons and the 
proportions or parts to which each shall be entitled, 
* * * ." The order of October 9, 1945 did not set forth 
the proportions or parts to which each heir was entitled. 
Nowhere in the instant probate proceedings was there 
any determination as to exactly what share of the estate 
each heir, including Virginia Latsis, the widow, was 
entitled to receive. As this determination of heirship 
was an essential condition precedent to the closing of 
the estate and final distribution, the failure to make such 
a determination of heirship has left this probate un-
finished and uncompleted. None of the heirs in Greece 
have transferred their interests in the real property 
of the estate and title thereto has remained vested in 
them in some undetermined proportions. 
POINT 5. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS ORDERS OF 
DECEMBER 12, 1952, DISMISSING THE PETITIONS DATED 
OCTOBER 26, 1951 AND AUGUST 1, 1952, RESPECTIVELY. 
On December 12, 1952 the District Court, by two 
separate orders, dismissed the two petitions of the non-
resident hei:r~s, both of which petitions directed the 
court's attention to the improper acts of Utah Savings 
& Trust Company and Virginia Latsis Zambukos, the 
co-administrators, and further prayed that the co-ad-
ministrators should be required to properly amninister 
the estate. One of the orders of December 1~, 1952 was 
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dismissing the petitions as to the trust company and the. 
other order dismissed the petitions as to Virginia Latsis 
Zambukos. The motions of the co-administrators to dis-
miss the petitions were identical and the grounds thereof 
upon which the court based its orders of dismissal were 
generally a claim of lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter and failure of the petitioners to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
In re Linford's Estate, 116 Utah 21, 207 Pac. 2d 
1033, involved a factual situation closely analogous to 
that of the instant case. In the Linford case a decree 
of distribution was entered in December 1942. In April 
1948 two heirs of the estate petitioned for an order to 
show cause why the decree of distribution should not be 
vacated and why the administratrix should not be com-
pelled to file a true inventory and make a proper distri-
bution. In granting 'such order, our court in the Linford 
case approved the procedure taken by the heirs in atta:ck-
ing the decree of distribution. The court stated: 
"This is not an action against the adminis-
tratrix, but rather a petition directing the court's 
attention to certain alleged fraudulent and im-
proper acts on the part of the administratrix, and 
requesting that the court require her to properly 
administer the estate." 
The court referred to In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 
128, 158 Pac. 705, where Section 75-11-37, Utah Code 
Aoootated 1953, providing for conclusiveness of settle-
ment of the final account was construed. As to the con-
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struction of that statute in the Raleigh case, our court 
stated: 
"* * * we construed the above quoted statute 
to mean that the settlement of an account, whether 
it be a final or an intermediary account, is con-
clusive as to all items included therein, provided 
that the statutory requirement of notice has been 
complied with, and no heir or party is laboring 
under any legal disability, unless the settlement 
is set aside in a proceeding in equity for fraud 
or mistake prosecuted as are proceedings to set 
aside other judgments. This case holds that the 
statute does not preclude the court from charging 
the personal representative with items of property 
which he has not included in his final account." 
(Italics ours). 
We contend that no final distribution was ever made 
in the instant case, nor could any final distribution be 
made upon the conditions imposed by the prior order 
of the probate court, which prior order was incorporated 
in the order of October 9, 1945, and we submit that the 
procedure approved by our court in the Linford case 
should equally apply and that the co-administrators in 
the instant case should now be compelled to fully admin-
ister this estate. 
The notice that was given on the final order of 
October 9, 1945 would indicate to any parties receiving 
it that a full and normal intestate distribution was con-
templated. We believe that to give our statutes l)l'Ovid-
ing for notice on distribution any meaning, if a modified 
distribution or any distribution less than the normal 
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intestate distribution is contemplated, that the notice 
must so inform all interested parties and that failure to 
give such notice is a jurisdictional defect. We have 
previously quoted the Utah case of Barrette v. Whitney, 
supra, which stands alone and is contrary to the general 
rule. The widely accepted general rule contrary to Bar-
rette v. Whitney has been set forth in a majority of states 
allowing collateral attack where there is a want of juris-
diction because of improper notice on a decree of distri-
bution. Teynor v. Heible, 133 Pac. 1 (Wash.); Baker v. 
Riordan, 4 Pac. 232 (Cal.) ; 21 Am. Jur. 655, Section 490. 
See also cases cited on page 17, supra. 
Irrespective of any consideration of the matter of 
notice or want of notice, and aside from any application 
of Barrette v. Whitney or the discredit which that deci-
sion has received from the courts of the sister states, the 
startling fact remains that title to the real property 
vested in the heirs at the date of death. Only an instru-
ment of conveyance could divest those heirs and transfer 
title to Virginia Latsis. No such instrument was ever 
executed, and title has remained in the heirs. We grant 
that by an appropriate action in the nature of a suit 
for specific performance, or other proper proceedings 
where the facts and jurisdiction warrant it, the court 
could order a conveyance or make a judgment of con-
veyance. No such action was brought, and irrespective 
of the procedural gymnastics of the administrator~s the 
title today is vested in the heirs subject to the cloud 
of the orders of distribution. 
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One of the grounds for dismissal was the claimed 
failure of the petitioners to join an indispensable party, 
presumably a grantee of the widow, to whom conveyance 
has been made of estate properties. The relief sought 
by the petitioners is an action directed against the two 
co-administrators for completion of the probate and for 
a distribution according to the laws of succession. The 
relief available to the petitioners can be had only from 
the administrators of the estate. 
CONCLUSION 
The entire contention of the non-resident heirs of 
James John Latsis is that the District Court erred in 
dismissing the petitions of those heirs for completion of 
probate proceedings and in thereby denying jurisdiction 
over the estate and the acts of the co-administrators. 
The acts of those fiduciaries in an attempted dis-
tribution were void. The order directing such distribu-
tion incorporated a prior order which imposed a con-
dition precedent to its operation and effectiveness. That 
condition was the acceptance of the stipulation in proper-
ty settlement, the receipt of moneys payable thereunder 
and the execution and receipt of proper instruments in 
transfer of the interests of the non-resident heirs. Those 
instruments must of necessity have included conveyances 
of the interests in real property of the estate. 
None of the court-imposed prerequisites to the yali-
dity of the modified distribution were fulfilled. To a;.;;.;ure 
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the non-resident heirs of due proces's, they must have 
had notice of any distribution other than that assured 
them by the laws of succession. Such notice they did 
not receive, and such notice was not given. 
To ignore the fact that the heirs in Greece received 
no knowledge or notice of the death of decedent or of 
any of the probate proceedings until 1950 (Tr. 184), 
and to allow a disinheritance of those heirs by the arbi-
trary and wilful acts of the co-administrators of this 
estate, is unconscionable. 
In the interests of justice to those heirs in Greece 
who, by their distance and remoteness from the scene 
of these proceedings, must rely on our courts for the 
preservation of their rights, it is prayed that the orders 
of the District Court dismissing the petitions of the non-
resident heirs for completion of the probate proceedings 
be reversed and that this matter be remanded to the 
District Court for vacating of the order of October 9, 
1945 and for further administration of this estate, in-
cluding an order for final distribution in accordance 
with the laws of succession. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WHITE, WRIGHT & ARNOVITZ 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTS.SON 
JAMES W. BELESS, JR. 
Attorneys for Petitioners and 
Appellants 
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